The Appellate Division affirmed, concurring in Supreme Court's conclusion that "the search warrant did not particularize that a search of the vehicles was permitted" and "probable cause to search those vehicles had not been established in the application for the search warrant" (169 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2d Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]). There is no "constitutional distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers" (id.). The determinative question on appeal is whether a valid warrant, supported by probable cause and authorizing the search of the "entire premises," permits the search of vehicles parked on the designated premises, when the vehicles may contain the items authorized to be seized by the warrant, but the warrant does not specifically mention the vehicles. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Citing Hansen and Dumper, we stated: "It is clear that a warrant to search a building does not include authority to search vehicles at the premises (People v Hansen, 38 NY2d 17; People v Dumper, 28 NY2d 296). This not only underscores that the corresponding state and federal constitutional provisions reach the same result, but also demonstrates that, traditionally, the Court "follow[ed] a policy of uniformity with the federal courts" when considering search-and-[*9]seizure arguments (Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 St. John's L Rev 399, 417 [1987]; see e.g. Our conclusion that the officers in this case exceeded the scope of the warrant finds support both in our prior cases and in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) (see Hanlon, 36 NY2d at 559 ["(P)robable cause (must be) demonstrated as a matter of fact in the manner prescribed by statute (CPL art. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. The State appealed that decision.
at 21 [emphasis added]). By Glenn Thrush,Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman. Although some Federal Courts of Appeals have interpreted the Fourth Amendment in a manner that might permit the search here, we decline to follow suit. These protections take shape in two ways . Counts 5 through 9 rested in large part on the physical evidence seized from the two vehicles. Posted on 26 Feb in greenshield pharmacy intervention codes. .
PDF Supreme Court of The United States Applying Ross, I would likewise hold that, where a warrant authorizes a search of the entire premises for items that could be found in a vehicle on those premises, it is reasonable to search a vehicle parked thereon, just as it would be for other containers found on the premises. Posted by Brett McGarry. People v Garvin, 30 NY3d 174, 185 n 8 [2017] ["Any issues regarding whether New York Constitution, article I, 12 provides greater protection . a premises) does not impliedly encompass the others. This site is maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary. It is not clear if the search, which was done with the cooperation of Mr. Bidens legal team, uncovered any additional classified files. However, Siegal struck back with a letter to Judge Feuerstein regarding the prosecutor's intentions to pursue criminal action against Drago: In its letter, the Government has asserted that, notwithstanding the suppression of theevidence, it intends to proceed with prosecuting John [Drago]. Like Sciacca and Dumper, Hansen focused on the basic tenets of probable cause of criminal activity in the warrants at issue and did not address the question here. This Court has never held that a mere reference or citation to both a state constitutional provision and its federal counterpart is enough to preserve an argument that the parallel state provision provides for heightened protection. Rather than forthright basing this extreme position on the Fourth Amendment and application of Supreme Court precedenta decision that would theoretically be more readily reviewed by the Supreme Court (perhaps because this Court has now become an outlier and created a "split" in the interpretation of Ross)the majority relies, in some unspecified way, on our case law that not only is inapposite, but also predates Ross and was decided without the benefit of subsequent constitutional law on the import of containers located in the areas designated to be searched in warrants. The People's contention that a search warrant authorizing the search of a premises encompasses an implicit grant of [*5]authority to search all vehicles located on the property undermines the legislature's delineation of three distinct categories as appropriate subjects of a search (see Matter of Orens v Novello, 99 NY2d 180, 187 [2002] ["When different terms are used in various parts of a statute or rule, it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is intended"], quoting Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 530 [1975]; Rangolan v County of Nassau, 96 NY2d 42, 47 [2001] ["where . Mr. Gordon based his argument on several of our prior decisions, including People v Dumper (28 NY2d 296 [1971]) and People v Hansen (38 NY2d 17 [1975], abrogated on other grounds by People v Ponder, 54 NY2d 160 [1981] [abrogating automatic standing]). 211214. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. . Collins v. Virginia One should hope not. Opinion by Judge Wilson. Indeed, a parallel citation indicates a belief by the litigant (or the court) that the state and federal provisions at issue are coextensive. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you.
2 Supreme Court cases review warrantless searches - Police1 No such connections were made here. Moreover, to the extent to which vehicle searches are authorized in a warrant, the vehicles must be "designated or described" (CPL 690.15 [1] [b]). the Legislature uses different terms in various parts of a statute, courts may reasonably infer that different concepts are intended"]). South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 367-368 [1976]; People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 [1993]). You're all set! United States v Evans, 92 F3d 540, 543 [7th Cir 1996] ["It seems to us that a car parked in a garage is just another interior container, like a closet or a desk"]; United States v Percival, 756 F2d 600, 612 [7th Cir 1985] ["Although a car is less fixed than a closet or cabinet, . We delineated an "independent body" of search-and-seizure law under the State Constitution, and we have explained that, because the state and federal provisions contain similar language and share a common history, any divergence in meaning must derive from a "noninterpretive analysis" focused on "circumstances peculiar to New York" (People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434, 438-439 [1991]). The parties dispute the proper standards for evaluating the sufficiency of the warrant application and whether the search of the vehicles conformed to the warrant's directives. We decline to distort our preservation rule in such a manner where, as here, the claim was brought to the attention of the courts below, litigated by the parties, and addressed by the courts. Every federal circuit court of appeals and every state high court that has addressed the questionuntil todayconcluded that vehicles are no different than other containers that might be found on premises, and, thus, heeding the directive from the United States Supreme Court that there is no constitutional distinction between types of containers, held that vehicles parked on the premises may reasonably be searched if they may contain the object of the search. This applies when a person has what is known as a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or thing to be searched. In its October 2019 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in a case that asks whether the Fourth Amendment "always permits a police officer to seize a motorist when the only thing. People v Gordon
at 127) is dictum and, in any event, lacks context as to its intended application. the premises" (Percival, 756 F2d at 600; compare United States v Reivich, 793 F2d 957, 963 [8th Cir 1986] [exempting "vehicle(s) of a guest or other caller" from the permissible scope of a premises warrant] with United States v Cole, 628 F2d 897, 899-900 [5th Cir 1980] [upholding the search of a truck of a third party that arrived on the property during the execution of the premises warrant]). A search warrant must direct a search of one or more of the following: A designated or described place or premises; A designated or described vehicle, as that term is defined in section 10.00 of the penal law; In this case, the police officers obtained a search warrant for two out of the three: (1) "the person of Tyrone Gordon" and (2) "the entire premises" from which Mr. Gordon was seen emerging. . In the Supreme Court of Georgia Decided: March 11, 2019 S18A1090. Rainey established that probable cause to search a suspect's residence did not encompass the authority to search a separate residence, even if both were located on the same premises. That determination must be based upon the factual allegations presented in the warrant application (Nieves, 36 NY2d at 402). it is no less fixed than a suitcase or handbag found on the premises, both of which can readily be searched under Ross if capable of containing the object of the search"]). It is the majority's treatment of the state constitutional issue that is most problematic. Our Court has never adopted a "fixed analytical formula for determining when the proper protection of fundamental rights requires resort to the State Constitution" (Scott, 79 NY2d at 491). Moreover, automobiles, unlike other containers, are typically titled and registered, and are also more often in public view, providing police officers with the means of establishing connections between the vehicle and the target of the search. Thus, to be valid, a search warrant must be "specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer" (People v Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 84 [2001], quoting People v Darling, 95 NY2d 530, 537 [2000]). Wilson, J. . Nonetheless, as part of the search of the "entire premises," police officers searched two vehicles found onsite: a Nissan Maxima and a Chevrolet sedan. In this case, by comparison, the warrant application contained no mention whatsoever of the existence of the vehicles ultimately searched, much less evidence connecting them to any criminality. In Hansen, we held that police officers had sufficient cause to search Hansen's residence after surveilling the residence for some time and observing pipes, scales, and other narcotics materials (Hansen, 38 NY2d at 20). You're all set!
Recent Court of Appeals Decision: 4th Amendment Violation | Search Additionally, all of those cases either directly rely on federal case law, or rely on New York cases that turned on federal case law, in deciding the search-and-seizure issues before them (see Sciacca, 45 NY2d at 127-129; Hansen, 38 NY2d at 21-23; Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299; Rainey, 14 NY2d at 38). Additionally no observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the van. Get free summaries of new New York Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! No. It's a fact that check cashing businesses handle a lot of cash and with a lot of cash comes a lot of reporting. As in Hansen, "no observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the [vehicles]" (Hansen, 38 NY2d at 20) that would substantiate a belief that the vehicles searched were utilized in the alleged criminal activity. provided an affidavit to an Eastern District of NYmagistrate judge to request a search of Kayla. A search and seizure is not valid unless it is based on either a warrant that was issued based on probable cause that a crime had been committed or upon an exception. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action'"]). 2021 NY Slip Op 01093
We have on several occasions addressed the permissible scope of a search based on allegations of illegal activity occurring at a residence or premises (see e.g. Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own. The Court held first that . In one of first impression for the Georgia Supreme Court, the issue this case presented centered on the effect of the States delay in obtaining search warrants for data contained in electronic devices when those devices were originally seized in a warrantless, but lawful, manner by police. So important is the role of the neutral and detached magistrate that we have in the past parted ways from federal constitutional jurisprudence when we believed that an emerging rule of federal constitutional law "dilute[s] . The dissent faults our prior decisions in Hansen, Dumper, Sciacca, and Rainey for failing to conduct an extensive analysis of whether state constitutional protections deviate from federal constitutional protections in this context, while simultaneously acknowledging that our state caselaw delineating that particular analysis postdates those decisions. Although this Court has, starting in the 1980s, adopted "independent standards" under the State Constitution,[FN10] we have also continued to stress that the history of article I, 12 of the New York Constitution "supports the presumption" that the provision against unlawful searches and seizures conforms with that found in the Fourth Amendment (People v P.J. Before Supreme Court, Mr. Gordon cited the same New York caselaw discussed above to argue that New York law has "consistently adhered to the position that a search warrant must specify the area to be searched." The Supreme Court did not address whether a search of an automobile could be upheld when the information supporting a warrant application is determined by a magistrate to justify the search of a premises but makes no mention of vehicles located on the property. Feuerstein askedMagistrate Judge Anne Y. I dissent. "This rule applies equally to all containers" (id. . Supreme Court's probable cause analysis is consonant with our prior cases and the record supports its finding, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the warrant application failed to establish probable cause to search the two vehicles. Steve Eder,Matthew Rosenberg,Joseph Goldstein,Mike Baker,Kassie Bracken. March 20, 2019. Court of Appeals
. In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), this Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures. Case Summary: 08-cv-04373 This case involves claims by numerous citizens that their constitutional rights were violated by the United States government through unauthorized surveillance of their telephone and internet activity by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other government actors under the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" or TSP.
IJ's Project on the 4th Amendment - Institute for Justice at 128). BOGGS, Justice. Against a backdrop of increasing national attention to police violence, the Supreme Court on Thursday issued an opinion in a closely watched criminal-procedure case that clarifies the meaning of the term "seizure.". This jurisdictional rule is grounded in the principle of federalism (see Long, 463 US at 1041, quoting Minnesota v National Tea Co., 309 US 551, 557 [1940] ["'It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. In an omnibus motion, Mr. Gordon moved to suppress that evidence. Federal authorities believed that Drago's business was not paying itsfair share of taxes payments that were insufficient and documentation that was incomplete. Defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized from the Nissan and Chevrolet.
Search and Seizure - The New York Times Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. The warrant application did not refer to any vehicles. "Listen to this mother, who lost two children to fentanyl poisoning, tell the truth about . At the police station, Detectives Fichter and Latorre conducted an inventory search of Williams' car in accordance with the NYPD's . As a consequence, police officers obtained a warrant for the "entire premises" of 529 Monroe Street, notwithstanding the fact that when they applied for the warrant, the police officers knew that the address contained two separate apartmentsone belonging to the suspect of the search, the other to an innocent third party. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses , papers , and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. In the Chevrolet, which defendant owned, the police recovered a loaded handgun from the engine block. Defense Attorney David Fischer successfully convinced Judge Kara K. Ueda in his motion to suppress the search and seizure because the stop itself for "illegal" tinted windows" was not legal and the subsequent search was not lawful because of the illegal stop and because the "pat search" was not lawful. Moreover, every other state high court that has addressed this issue has, like the federal courts, held that a warrant authorizing a search of the entire premises permits the police to search vehicles located thereon [FN5]. Nor do we believe that the warrant for Mr. Gordon's "person" or "premises"in the context of the factual allegations averred by the detectivesauthorized a search of the vehicles. No. The warrant authorized the police to search for, among other things, heroin, money as the proceeds of an illicit drug business, cell phones, computers, and drug paraphernalia. The Chevrolet, parked in the backyard behind two fences, was unregistered. This means that law enforcement agents need probable cause, and a warrant in most cases, to search your person or belongings. The People and dissent contend that we should extend the reasoning of Ross to hold, as some Federal Courts of Appeals have, that vehicles located outside a residence are no different from any other "closets, chests, drawers, [or] containers" located within (id. The People opposed, arguing that the search warrant was not restricted to the private dwelling, but authorized the search of the "entire premises," which includes the house located at the address as well as the surrounding curtilage, and that the search of the vehicles parked thereon was reasonable as they could and did contain contraband sought by the warrant. For example, "a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found" (Ross, 456 US at 821). Video, 68 NY2d at 307 [noting that Hanlon "imposed a specific, nondelegable burden on the magistrate which required that (the magistrate), not the police, determine probable cause"]). The police searched a car based on the smell of marijuana. Cases involving violations of basic rights of citizensin order to achieve a criminal enforcement action is simply wrong. at 37). We explained: "The observations of the police were that this van had made 'trips in and out carrying at least one other person in addition to the driver', and that it was 'the sole vehicle observed entering and leaving these premises on a regular basis'.